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CASENOTE

Dale v. Boy Scouts of America: Whether the
Application of New Jersey's Public
Accommodations Law, Forcing the Boy
Scouts to Include an Avowed Homosexual,
Violates the Scouts' First Amendment
Freedom of Expressive Association

In Dale v. Boy Scouts of America,' the United States Supreme Court
held that the application of a New Jersey public accommodations law,
forcing the Boy Scouts to extend membership to an avowed homosexual
and gay rights activist, violated the Boy Scout's First Amendment right
to freedom of expressive association.2 The Court held New Jersey's law
burdens the Boy Scouts' right to oppose homosexual conduct, and New
Jersey's interest in curbing discrimination does not justify the intrusion
on the Boy Scouts' right to freedom of expressive association.
I.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

In 1978, at the age of eight, James Dale ("Dale") joined the Monmouth
Council's Cub Scout Pack 142. In 1981 Dale became a Boy Scout and

1. 120 S. Ct. 2446 (2000).
2. Id. at 2449.

746

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 52

eventually earned the rank of Eagle Scout, one of scouting's highest
honors. In 1989 Dale began college at Rutgers University. At that time
he applied for adult membership with the Boy Scouts of America ("Boy
Scouts") and became an assistant scoutmaster.3
While at Rutgers, Dale openly admitted, for the first time, that he was
gay. Dale became copresident of the Rutgers University Lesbian/Gay
Alliance. In July 1990 Dale attended a seminar that discussed the
psychological and health needs of gay teenagers. After interviewing
Dale at the seminar, a newspaper published the interview and included
a photograph of Dale. The photograph's caption identified Dale as the
copresident of the Lesbian/Gay Alliance. Later that month, Monmouth
Council Executive James Kay revoked Dale's adult membership. Kay
explained to Dale that the Boy Scouts "specifically forbid membership to
homosexuals."4
Demanding to be reinstated, Dale filed a complaint against the Boy
Scouts alleging that the Boy Scouts, as a place of public accommodation,
violated New Jersey's Law Against Discrimination ("LAD") by revoking
his membership and expelling him from his position of Assistant
Scoutmaster.5 The trial court granted summary judgment for the Boy
Scouts, holding: (1) LAD does not apply to the Boy Scouts because the
Boy Scouts is not a "place of public accommodation;"' (2) the Boy Scouts
met the statutory exclusion from LAD because it was an "institution...
which is in its nature distinctly private;"7 and (3) the Boy Scouts "First
Amendment freedom of expressive association rights prevent[ed]
government from forcing them to accept [Dale] as an adult leadermember" because the Boy Scouts has historically believed that homosexual conduct is morally wrong.' Therefore, to allow Dale, a known
homosexual, to serve as an adult leader would be "absolutely antithetical
to the purpose of Scouting."9
The Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division, reversed and
remanded.' ° The court held: (1) the Boy Scouts is a place of public
accommodation under New Jersey's LAD; (2) by expelling Dale and
depriving him of a public accommodation, the Boy Scouts violated LAD;
and (3) applying LAD to prohibit the Boy Scouts from excluding

3.
4.
5.
6.

Id. at 2449.
Id.
Dale v. Boy Scouts of America, 706 A.2d 270, 277 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1998).
Id.

7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 293.
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homosexuals does not infringe upon the Boy Scouts' freedom of
expressive association" or its freedom of intimate association. 2 The
New Jersey Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Appellate
Division. 3
The United States Supreme Court granted the Boy Scouts' petition for
certiorari to determine whether applying New Jersey's LAD violated the
Boy Scouts' First Amendment right of expressive association. 4 The
Court examined the issue in three steps and held that the Boy Scouts'
freedom of expressive association had been violated. 5 Therefore, the
Court reversed the judgment
of the New Jersey Supreme Court and
6
remanded the case.'
II.

LEGAL BACKGROUND

Though freedom of association is not expressly recognized in the
Federal Constitution, such a right "may be inferred from other rights
and protections guaranteed by the constitution." 7 In the 1958 case of
NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson," the Court first recognized that
freedom of association is protected by the Constitution. 9 In Patterson
the NAACP was held in contempt by an Alabama state court when the
NAACP refused to disclose a complete list of its members to the court.2 °
However, the United States Supreme Court noted that forcing the
NAACP to disclose a complete list of its members could cause some
members to leave the group, as well as causing others not to join.2 '
Thus, because the State's order could prevent the NAACP members from
pursuing a "collective effort to foster [their] beliefs,"22 the Court ruled
that the State's order violated the NAACP's freedom of association.2 3
Freedom of association was deemed "an inseparable aspect of 'liberty'

11. Id. at 274.
12. Id. at 286.
13. Dale v. Boy Scouts of America, 734 A.2d 1196, 1230 (1999).
14. 120 S. Ct. at 2449.
15. Id. at 2457.
16. Id. at 2458.
17. Dale, 706 A.2d at 285.
18. 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
19. 16A AM. JUR. 2D ConstitutionalLaw § 539 (1998) ("It is generally conceded that the
right of association may be traced to Justice Harlan's opinion for the Supreme Court in
NAACP v.Alabama. In a number of prior opinions, however, the Supreme Court had
mentioned, or had hinted in some rather vague way, that a 'right of association' existed."
A list of those prior cases can be found in 16A Am. Jur. 2d § 539 n.62.
20. 357 U.S. at 451.
21. Id. at 462-63.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 462.
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24
assured by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment."
The State failed to show an interest sufficient to justify suppressing the
NAACP's right to associate.25
Seven years later in Griswold v.Connecticut," the Supreme Court
extended the freedom of association to intimate relationships, including
family relationships. 27 The Court held that a Connecticut law that
prohibited the use of birth control impinged upon a married couples'
freedom of association. 2' The Court noted that although freedom of
association is not mentioned explicitly in the Constitution,2 9 association
in certain contexts is a form of expressing one's opinion3" and "[tihe
right of association [is] contained in the penumbra of the First Amendment."31
The Court applied the freedom of association against a state's public
accommodations law in the 1984 decision of Roberts v. United States
Jaycees.32 In Roberts a Minnesota Act prohibited gender discrimination
in places of public accommodation.33 When two local Jaycees chapters
admitted a woman, the Jaycees' national organization threatened to
revoke the two chapters' charters. The two chapters filed discrimination
charges against the national organization. The national organization
argued that the Act would, in essence, force them to admit women,
34

which violated their constitutional freedom of association rights.

The Court in Roberts expressly distinguished between two forms of
association: (1) intimate association, and (2) expressive association.35

24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.

Id. at 460.
Id. at 465.
381 U.S. 479 (1965).
Id. at 485-86.
Id.
Id. at 482.
Id. at 483.

31. Id. at 484; see also Stephen P. Warren, Note, Of Merit Badges and Sexual
Orientation:The New Jersey Supreme Court Balances the Law Against Discriminationand
the Freedom of Association in Dale v. Boy Scouts of America, 30 SETON HALL L. REV. 951,
960 n.57 (2000).

32. 468 U.S. 609, 612 (1984); see also Cara J. Frey, Hate Exposed to the Light of Day:
Determining the Boy Scouts of America's Expressive Purpose Solely From Objective
Evidence, 75 WASH. L. REV. 577, 578, 583-87 (2000) (referring to the Roberts case as the
beginning of the "Roberts trilogy," a line of three cases that establish the framework for
balancing the right to be free from discrimination versus a group's right to associate. The
other two cases (discussed infra) are Board of Directors of Rotary Internationalv. Rotary
Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. 537 (1987), and New York State Club Ass'n v. City of New York,
487 U.S. 1 (1988)).
33. 468 U.S. at 614-15 (citing MINN. STAT. § 363.03, subd. 3 (1982)).
34. Id.
35. Id. at 617-18.
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Both the freedom of intimate association and the freedom of expressive
association are guaranteed by the Constitution as fundamental to
personal liberty.36 Pertaining to intimate association, a group is more
likely to be afforded constitutional protection if the group is, among
other things, small, selective, and seclusive.37 The Court ruled that
because the Jaycees is a large and primarily unselective (except for age
and sex) group, it is not protected under an intimate association
claim.38
Turning to expressive association, the Court stated that "implicit in
the right to engage in activities protected by the First Amendment [is]
a corresponding right to associate with others in pursuit of a wide
variety of political, social, economic, educational, religious, and cultural
ends."3" Forcing a group to accept a member clearly intrudes on that
group's affairs.4" However, the State may impinge upon a group's right
to associate for expressive purposes if the State's regulations "serve
compelling state interests, unrelated to the suppression of ideas, that
cannot be achieved through means significantly less restrictive of
associational freedoms."4 '
Applying the facts of Roberts, the Court ruled that the goal of the Act
was not to hinder a group's expression, 42 that the Act served a compelling state interest of eliminating discrimination, 43 and that the State
"abridge[d] no more speech or associational freedom than [was]
necessary to accomplish [its] purpose."4 4 Therefore, the Court found
that the Act, although forcing the Jaycees to allow females to become
members, was valid. 45
The Supreme Court reapplied the factors from Roberts in the 1987
case Board of Directors of Rotary International v. Rotary Club of
Duarte.4' However, the Court added that if a group is not forced to
"abandon or alter" one of its activities by including certain members,
then that group's exclusionary policy will not be constitutionally
protected.4 v In deciding whether a California statute violated the First

36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.

Id. at 618.
Id. at 620.
Id. at 621.
Id. at 622.
Id. at 623.
Id.
Id. at 623-24.
Id. at 624.
Id. at 629.
Id.
481 U.S. 537 (1987).
Id. at 548.
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Amendment by requiring Rotary Clubs to admit female members, the
Court held that the Duarte Rotary Club ("Club") was not afforded
intimate association protection because of its large size, its visuality in
public, and its inclusive rather than exclusive membership policy."
The Club was not afforded expressive association protection because it
failed to prove that the inclusion of women would affect the Club's
existing members from carrying out their various purposes.49 Nor did
the inclusion of women force the Club to abandon any of its goals or
activities.50 In addition, the Court remarked that even if the State
infringed slightly on the Club members' right to expressive association,
such an infringement was justified by the State's compelling interest to
eliminate discrimination against women.51
In the following year, the Court in New York State Club Ass'n v. City
of New York 5" followed the above precedents, but added that a group's
exclusionary policy must be connected with its ability to carry out its
expressive purposes.5 3 In this case, New York City amended a law to
prevent discrimination in private clubs that are essentially public in
nature.54 The New York State Club Association claimed that the law
violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments.55 The Supreme Court
disagreed.56
The Court noted that the following factors were significant in showing
that intimate association protection would not be afforded to all clubs:
(1) some of the clubs were comparable in size to the groups in Roberts
and Rotary; (2) the clubs provided services to nonmembers; and (3) the
clubs received payments from nonmembers.57 Even though "a considerable amount of private or intimate association [may occur] in such a
setting,

...

that fact alone does not afford [a club] constitutional

immunity to practice discrimination" barred by statute.58 In addition,
even if some clubs may qualify for protection under freedom of intimate
association, not all clubs will be protected, and thus the law is valid in
some situations.5 9

48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.

Id. at 547.
Id. at 548.
Id.
Id. at 549.
487 U.S. 1 (1988).
Id. at 13.
Id. at 5.
Id. at 7.
Id. at 8.
Id. at 12.
Id.
Id.
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The Court also dismissed an expressive association argument. °
Again, the Court noted that some clubs may have been afforded such
protection, but many would not, and thus the law was not invalid on its
face. 6 ' The Court considered that the New York law did not prevent
associations from forming to advocate public or private views,62 nor did
it force clubs to halt or alter activities protected by the First Amendment.' The law also did not prevent a club from excluding an individual who did not share the views that the club promoted. 4 Instead,
race, sex, and other specified characteristics cannot be used as "shorthand measures" instead of more legitimate criteria for determining
membership. 5
In Dale the Supreme Court again examined whether a public
accommodations law infringed upon a group's freedom of expressive
association.' The Court in Dale broke from the trend set in the above
cases. For the first time, the Court ruled that a public accommodations
law was unconstitutional because it infringed on a group's right of
expressive association without serving a compelling interest.67
III.

LEGAL REASONING

In a five-to-four majority opinion, the United States Supreme Court in
Dale applied a three-prong test before holding that the Boy Scouts' First
Amendment right of expressive association was violated by the
application of New Jersey's Law Against Discrimination ("LAD") to
prohibit the Boy Scouts from excluding gays. 8 Chief Justice Rehnquist
delivered the opinion of the Court, joined by Justices O'Connor, Scalia,
Kennedy, and Thomas.69
After discussing the procedural history of the case, the Court reviewed
the beneficial policy concerns connected with the freedom of expressive
association.70 The Court noted that the right to expressive association
preserves political and cultural diversity and prevents the majority from
suppressing dissident expression. 7' Furthermore, the Court added that

60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.

Id. at 13.
Id. at 14.
Id. at 13.
Id. (citing Rotary, 481 U.S. at 548).
Id.
Id.
Dale, 120 S. Ct. at 2449.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2451.
Id. (citing Roberts, 468 U.S. at 622).

752

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 52

"[tihe forced inclusion of an unwanted person in a group infringes the
group's freedom of expressive association if the presence of that person
affects in a significant way the group's ability to advocate public or
private viewpoints." 72 However, the Court recognized that the freedom
of expressive association "could be overridden 'by regulations adopted to
serve compelling state interests, unrelated to the suppression of ideas,
that cannot be achieved 7through
means significantly less restrictive of
3
associational freedoms.'
The Court applied a three-prong test to determine whether the Boy
Scouts is protected by the First Amendment's right of expressive
association.74 In the first prong, the Court looked at whether the Boy
Scouts engages in expressive association. 7' To be protected by the First
Amendment's freedom of expressive association, "a group must engage
in some form of expression, whether it be public or private."76 The
Court looked to the words of the Boy Scouts' mission statement, its Scout
Oath, and the Scout Law.77 Because the Boy Scouts seeks to "instill
values in young people" 7' by having adult leaders act as leaders and
role models, the Court found it "indisputable" that the Boy Scouts, which
"seeks to transmit such a system of values[,] engages in expressive
79
activity.

72.
73.
74.
75.
76.

Id. (citing New York State Club, 487 U.S. at 13).
Id. (quoting Roberts, 468 U.S. at 623).
Id.
Id.
Id.

77. Id. at 2451-52. The mission statement reads as follows:
It is the mission of the Boy Scouts of America to serve others by helping to instill
values in young people and, in other ways, to prepare them to make ethical
choices over their lifetime in achieving their full potential. The values we strive
to instill are based on those found in the Scout Oath and Law.
Id. at 2451. The Scout Oath reads as follows: "On my honor I will do my best [t]o do my
duty to God and my country and to obey the Scout Law; To help other people at all times;
To keep myself physically strong, mentally awake, and morally straight." Id. at 2451-52.
The Scout Law reads as follows:
A Scout is:
Trustworthy
Obedient
Loyal
Cheerful
Helpful
Thrifty
Friendly
Brave
Courteous
Clean
Kind
Reverant.
Id. at 2452.
78. Id. at 2452 (quoting the Boy Scouts' mission statement).
79. Id.
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After finding that prong one was satisfied, the Court turned to prong
two: "whether the forced inclusion of Dale as an assistant scoutmaster
would significantly affect the Boy Scouts' ability to advocate public or
private viewpoints." 0 To answer this question, the Court first tried to
discern the Boy Scouts' actual view towards homosexuality."1 Though
the Scout Oath does not mention sexuality directly, it does include the
terms "morally straight" and "clean." 2 The Court took into account
statements made by the Boy Scouts that: (1) it "teach[es] that homosexual conduct is not morally straight;"" and (2) it does "not want to
promote homosexual conduct as a legitimate form of behavior."84 Also,
the Court cited position statements made by the Boy Scouts in 1978,
1991, and 1993 that state homosexuals are not allowed membership. 5
In addition, in Curran v. Mount Diablo Council of Boy Scouts of
America,"8 filed in the early 1980s, the Boy Scouts purported the same
position towards homosexuality as it conveyed in Dale.7 Because of
the consistency of the above evidence, the Court concluded the Boy
Scouts' alleged view towards homosexuality was sincere. 8
After discerning the Boy Scouts' attitude towards sexuality, the Court
"[gave] deference to [the Boy Scouts'] view of what would impair its
expression." 9 Dale holds himself out to the community as being gay,
and thus his presence would send a message that the Boy Scouts
"accept[] homosexual conduct as a legitimate form of behavior." 90
Forcing the Boy Scouts to admit Dale would, in effect, compel the Boy
Scouts to "propound a point of view contrary to its beliefs."91
The Court in Dale supported its proposition by citing Hurley v. IrishAmerican Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston. 2 In Hurley the
Court held that Massachusetts violated the First Amendment by
requiring private citizens who organized a parade to include among the
participants a group imparting a message the organizers did not wish to

80. Id.

81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 2453 (quoting Petitioners' Brief at 39).
84. Id. (quoting Petitioners' Reply Brief at 5).
85. Id.
86. 952 P.2d 218 (Cal. 1998).
87. 120 S. Ct. at 2453 (citing Curran, 952 P.2d at 218).
88. Id.

89. Id.
90. Id. at 2454.
91. Id.
92. 515 U.S. 557 (1995).
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convey.93 The Court in Dale, quoting Hurley, stated that "the choice of
a speaker not to propound a particular point of94view ... is presumed to
lie beyond the government's power to control."
Moreover, the Court remarked: "[An] association[] do[es] not have to
associate for the 'purpose' of disseminating a certain message in order
to be entitled to the protections of the First Amendment."95 Certainly,
the First Amendment "does not require that every member of a group
agree on every issue in order for the group's policy to be 'expressive
association.'" 9'6 For these reasons, the Court answered prong two by
holding that the forced inclusion of Dale would significantly affect the
Boy Scouts' ability to advocate its desired views.97
Finally, the Court addressed prong three: "whether the application of
New Jersey's [LAD] to require that the Boy Scouts accept Dale as an
assistant scoutmaster runs afoul of the Boy Scout's freedom of expressive
association."98 The Court began its prong three analysis by noting that
public accommodations laws have expanded in scope from covering
physical places to covering places where the public may be invited, such
as summer camps. 99 The Court recognized that New Jersey broadened
the public accommodations definition by applying its public accommodations law to the Boy Scouts, a private entity, "without even attempting
to tie the term 'place' to a physical location.""°
Next, the Court
applied a traditional First Amendment analysis.' 1
Although the
parade in Hurley was not deemed an expressive association, the Court
noted that the First Amendment analysis in Hurley is similar to the
analysis applied in Dale. °2 Answering prong three, the Court held
New Jersey's requirement that Dale be admitted significantly burdened
the Boy Scouts' "right to oppose or disfavor homosexual conduct."' 3
New Jersey's interest was not enough to justify "such a severe intrusion

93. Id. at 559.
94. 120 S. Ct. at 2454 (quoting Hurley, 515 U.S. at 575). The Court did not rely on
Hurley, a freedom of speech case, to reach its holding in Dale, a freedom of association case.
However, the Court used aspects of the decision in Hurley to support its reasoning in Dale.
For a summary of Hurley, see Frey, supra note 33, at 587-89 (also distinguishing between
the Hurley case and the "Roberts trilogy").
95. 120 S. Ct. at 2454.
96. Id. at 2455.
97. Id. at 2454.
98. Id. at 2455.
99. Id. at 2455-56.
100. Id. at 2456.
101. Id. at 2457.
102. Id.
103. Id.
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10 4
on the Boy Scouts' rights to freedom of expressive association."
Therefore, New Jersey's LAD forcing the Boy Scouts to accept Dale as an
assistant
scoutmaster violated the Boy Scouts' First Amendment
05
right.
In dissent Justice Stevens, along with Justices Souter, Ginsburg, and
Breyer, stated that New Jersey's LAD neither burdens the Boy Scouts'
"'collective effort on behalf of [its] shared goals, '" ' nor forces the Boy
10 7
Scouts to express any message that it does not want to promote.
Justice Stevens emphasized that sexual matters are never expressly
mentioned in either the Boy Scouts' Law or Oath,'0° and that Scoutmasters are not to instruct Scouts about sex.0 9
Justice Stevens was not persuaded by the prior position statements
made by the Boy Scouts that the organization actively expressed a view
against homosexual conduct. In his discussion, Justice Stevens cited a
1978 letter signed by the Boy Scouts' President."0 Admittedly, the
letter did adopt an exclusionary membership policy; however, "simply
adopting a policy has never been considered sufficient, by itself, to
prevail on a right to associate claim.""' Moreover, the 1978 policy was
never publicly expressed." 2 The letter also stated that, if an antidis-

Id.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 2459-60 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Roberts, 468 U.S. at 622).
107. Id. at 2460.
108. Id. at 2461.
109. Id. at 2462. Justice Stevens quoted the Scoutmaster Handbook (1972), which
reads: "You may have boys asking you for information or advice about sexual matters ....
How should you handle such matters? Rule number 1: You do not undertake to instruct
Scouts, in any formalized manner, in the subject of sex and family life." Id. at 2462.
110. The portion of the letter quoted by Justice Stevens is as follows:
4. Q. May an individual who openly declares himself to be a homosexual be
employed by the Boy Scouts of America as a professional or non-professional?
A. Boy Scouts of America does not knowingly employ homosexuals as professionals or non-professionals. We are unaware of any present laws which would
prohibit this policy.
5. Q. Should a professional or non-professional individual who openly declares
himself to be a homosexual be terminated?
A. Yes, in the absence of any law to the contrary. At the present time we are
unaware of any statute or ordinance in the United States which prohibits
discrimination against individual's employment upon the basis of homosexuality.
In the event that such a law was applicable, it would be necessary for the Boy
Scouts of America to obey it, in this case as in Paragraph 4 above. It is our
position, however, that homosexuality and professional or non-professional
employment in Scouting are not appropriate.
Id. at 2463 (emphasis omitted).
111. Id. at 2464.
112. Id. at 2463.
104.
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crimination law conflicted with the Boy Scouts' policy, then a Scout must
adhere to the laws, regardless of that Scout's own beliefs."' Although
the letter states that homosexuality is inappropriate, the letter does not
connect that statement to a shared goal or expressive activity of the Boy
Scouts."' The subsequent policy statements relied on by the majority
were issued after the Boy Scouts revoked Dale's membership, and thus
are not relevant." 5 In addition, the Boy Scouts never took a "clear and
unequivocal view," which is needed to prevail over an antidiscrimination
law."' For these reasons, the Boy Scouts failed to prove
either a clear
7
position or expressive activity connected to its policy."
Placing Dale in context of past decisions, Justice Stevens noted:
until today, [the Court has] never once found a claimed right to
associate in the selection of members to prevail in the face of a State's
antidiscrimination law. To the contrary, we have squarely held that
a State's antidiscrimination law does not violate a group's right to
associate simply because the law conflicts with that group's exclusionary membership policy."8
Justice Stevens then listed principles made clear by the Court in Jaycees
and Rotary Club."9 Simply engaging in expressive activity adopting
an exclusionary membership policy is not enough for a claim of
expressive association to trump a State's antidiscrimination law. 2 °
Moreover, the connection between a group's exclusionary policy
and a
2
group's expressive activity must be more than merely stated.' '
For the above reasons, Justice Stevens examined what, exactly, the
Boy Scouts' shared goals were and to what extent the inclusion of22
homosexuals would affect the Boy Scouts' expressive activities.
Rather than deferring to the Boy Scouts' assertions in their briefs,
Justice Stevens believed that the evidence, which included the Boy
Scouts' mission statement, Oath, and its hands-off approach towards
dealing with sexuality, demonstrated that the Boy Scouts "has no shared
goal of disapproving of homosexuality."' 21 In addition, Stevens did not

113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.

Id. at
Id. at
Id.
Id. at
Id.at
Id.at
Id.at
Id.at
Id.
Id.at
Id.at

2463-64.
2464.
2465.
2466.
2467.
2468.
2468-69.
2469-70.
2470.
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believe24 that admitting Dale as a member would express any message.
Justice Stevens distinguished Hurley from Dale.125 Unlike the group
to be included in Hurley, Dale's inclusion in the Boy Scouts would
neither express a message nor constitute an act of First Amendment
symbolic speech. 2 ' Justice Stevens stated that "a different kind of
scrutiny must be given to an expressive association claim, lest the right
of expressive association simply turn into a right to discriminate
whenever some group can think of an expressive object that would seem
127
to be inconsistent with the admission of some person as a member."
Therefore, Justice Stevens asserted that the application of New Jersey's
LAD forcing the Boy Scouts to include28 Dale did not violate the Boy
Scouts' right to expressive association.1
Justice Souter, along with Justices Ginsburg and Breyer, joined
Justice Stevens' dissent, but included additional comments.'29 Justice
Souter concluded that the Boy Scouts has "not made out an expressive
association claim,. . . not because of what [the Boy Scouts] may espouse,
but because of its failure to make sexual orientation the subject of any
unequivocal advocacy, using the channels it customarily employs to state
its message." 3 ° Justice Souter noted that, to allow a party to claim a
right of expressive association on a position that it does not unequivocally advocate, and "to allow exemption from a public accommodations
statute based on any individual's difference from an alleged group ideal,
however expressed and however inconsistently claimed, would convert
association into an easy trump of any antidiscrimthe right of expressive
3
ination law."' '
IV.

IMPLICATIONS

An interesting aspect of Dale is that the New Jersey Supreme Court
became the first State Supreme Court to hold that the Boy Scouts is a
place of public accommodation, and thus subject to a public accommodations law. 3 2 No federal appellate court has reached such a holding.
In fact, four other state supreme courts have reached the opposite

124. Id. at 2476.
125. Id. at 2475.

126. Id.
127. Id. at 2476.
128. Id. at 1476-77.
129. Id. at 2478 (Souter, J., dissenting).
130. Id. at 2479.
131. Id.
132. 120 S. Ct. at 2456 n.3.

758

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 52

conclusion.'3 3 The United States Supreme Court did not state a
holding on this particular
issue. However, the Court did mention how
"extremely broad""3 4 the definition of a public accommodation had been
stretched by New Jersey. The Court also noted that, in applying its
public accommodations law to a private entity such as the Boy Scouts,
the State did not even attempt "to tie the term 'place' to a physical
location."13' As a result of this expanding definition, Dale illustrates
that the number of conflicts between public accommodations statutes
and groups' First Amendment rights of association will only increase in
the future.3 6
Most significantly, Dale is the first case in which a right to associate
prevailed over a state's antidiscrimination law. 3 ' Until Dale, the
Court has "squarely held [to the contrary] that a state's antidiscrimination law does not violate a group's right to associate simply because the
law conflicts with that group's exclusionary membership policy."3 8
Dale does not overturn prior cases such as Roberts, Duarte, and New
York State Club. The analysis of an expressive association claim, as of
now, will remain the same as that explained in Roberts. However, Dale
may open the window of opportunity for organizations to legally and
blatantly discriminate against homosexuals. If nothing else, the
majority opinion in Dale may provide a blueprint for groups who wish
to discriminate and exclude homosexuals.
Of high interest is the majority's deference to the Boy Scouts' view of
what would impair its expression.'39 Both dissents suggest that the
evidence failed to prove the Boy Scouts clearly and unequivocally
advocate against homosexuality. 14
Justice Stevens noted that by
deferring to positions stated in a party's brief, the boundaries of
legitimate right to associate claims would be lost, civil rights legislation
could become a "nullity," and the "important constitutional right" of

133. Id. The cases mentioned are the following: Curran, 952 P.2d 218 (Cal. 1998);
Seaburn v. Coronado Area Council, Boy Scouts of Am., 891 P.2d 385 (Kan. 1995);
Quinnipiac Council, Boy Scouts of Am., Inc. v. Commission on Human Rights &
Opportunities, 528 A.2d 352 (Conn. 1987); Schwenk v. Boy Scouts of Am., 551 P.2d 465 (Or.
1976). In addition, the United States Court of Appeals held that the Boy Scouts is not a
place of public accommodation (Welsh v. Boy Scouts ofAm., 993 F.2d 1267 (7th Cir. 1993).
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expressive association could become a "farce.""' With that in mind,
association
the majority's holding could "convert the right of expressive
42
into an easy trump of any antidiscrimination law."

Also, the majority held that the State's interest in curbing the harmful
effects of discrimination does not justify an intrusion on the Boy Scouts'
"right to oppose or disfavor homosexual conduct." 4 1 In his dissent,
Justice Stevens noted that, unless a different type of scrutiny is applied,
the right to expressive association will allow groups to discriminate
whenever a group can contrive an expressive object inconsistent with the
admission of an unwanted person'"
Issues addressing homosexuality flood the media daily, and they are
pouring into the courtroom. The Court in Dale resolved this case by a
five-to-four majority, with Justice Steven's dissent stretching nearly
twice as long as Justice Rehnquist's opinion. However, it remains to be
seen whether the right to freedom of expressive association will truly
Past cases
become "an easy trump of any antidiscrimination law."'
would indicate no, but Dale may have opened that door.
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